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Abstract
This article examines the environmental issues of the Russian Far East (Pacifi c 
Russia) in the context of Northeast Asia. The author deals with problems such 
as military-related and nuclear factors of environmental security, excessive 
exploitation of forests and marine biological resources, the ecological risks of 
big energy projects, environmental conditions in urban areas and trans-border 
aspects of environmental security. Political, social and economic factors affecting 
environmental decision-making in the Russian Far East are analyzed.
Keywords: environmental security, the Russian Far East, Northeast Asia, multilateral 
cooperation. 
Introduction
The Russian Far East,2 with its territory of 6.63 million sq km (roughly two-thirds the size 
of the United States), plays a vital role in Northeast Asia’s environmental security. This 
Pacifi c area of Russia is important in mitigating climate change, maintaining biological 
diversity, and providing a reservoir of natural resources for future generations. It also 
serves as an example of how domestic, transnational and regional factors affect an 
environmental situation. 
The Far East has always been viewed by the Russian government as the country’s 
strategically and militarily crucial Pacifi c bulwark. Consequently, many military facilities 
and installations, some of them environmentally hazardous, are concentrated in the region. 
The Far East has traditionally functioned as a storehouse of natural resources for the 
Russian state. The region’s main natural riches include fi sh and other seafood, timber, and 
nonferrous metal deposits. In recent years, exploitation of hydrocarbon energy resources, 
particularly oil and gas on the Sakhalin Island shelf, has increased. Moreover, major oil 
and gas pipelines running through the Far Eastern territories are now under construction.
The impact of transnational and trans-border factors on the ecology of the 
Russian Far East is considerable. The region shares borders with the People’s Republic 
of China, North Korea, and Japan, each of which affect the environment of the Russian 
Far East through their economic activities. Furthermore, North Korea poses a potential 
threat because of its nuclear ambitions, which, in the worst-case scenario, could lead to 
1   Artyom Lukin is Associate Professor at the Vladivostok Institute of International Relations, Far Eastern 
National University (Vladivostok, Russia). He can be contacted at artlukin@mail.ru.
2   The Russian Far East includes the Pacifi c territories of Russia and some territories of eastern Siberia, east 
of Lake Baikal.
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violent armed confl ict or the use of weapons of mass destruction, spelling environmental 
disaster.
Finally, it is necessary to take into account the hierarchy of priorities in political 
and economic decision making in Russia. Various high-level legislative and executive acts 
declare environmental protection as one of the main interests of public policy in Russia.3 
However, in reality environmental protection has never been a top priority of Russian 
government policy. There are a number of reasons for this. The states generally begin 
to deal with environmental issues after they enter a post-industrial stage in their socio-
economic development, that is, when they gain suffi cient fi nancial and technological 
resources necessary for effective green policies. One can refer to Japan and rich Western 
countries as an example. If a nation is not post-industrial and wealthy, it is diffi cult to expect 
it to pursue a vigorous (and costly) green policy, unless the environmental problems are so 
dire that they immediately threaten the national well-being, people’s health and economic 
growth. This is certainly the case with China, which has to act on the environmental front, 
even though it is not a rich developed country by all accounts. 
Russia’s relative indifference with regard to ecological concerns is also caused 
by the structure of its political culture, which is state-centric. The core value has always 
been the survival and physical strength of the Russian State as a totality rather than the 
quality of life of its citizens as individuals. Thus the main threats are the ones which 
affect the territorial integrity of the State, its political sovereignty and its military might. 
Environmental issues have been, and continue to be, viewed as something less serious, 
largely linked to human, as opposed to State, security. Therefore they get less attention.
On top of that, the central government in Moscow has traditionally cared less about 
ecological concerns in the distant and thinly populated Far East compared to Russia’s 
core western regions, especially since the Pacifi c coast is still viewed by some as a kind 
of natural resource–rich appendage rather than a genuine part of the country.
Military Aspects of Environmental Security
Nuclear issues
Except for the Bilibino power plant in Chukotka Peninsula, the major nuclear facilities 
in the Russian Far East have military signifi cance. These include holding strategic 
and tactical nuclear weapons, maintaining active-duty and decommissioned nuclear 
submarines, and storing submarine-spent nuclear fuel materials. The presence of such 
installations and facilities causes an increased risk of nuclear accidents and leaks. The 
most serious accident of such a kind happened in 1985 in Chazhma Bay of Primorskiy 
Krai (Maritime Province), not far from the city of Nakhodka. The submarine’s active 
reactor exploded during refueling. Ten people were killed and more than 260 people were 
exposed to radiation. The bay and nearby shores were contaminated with radioactive 
substances.
One of the region’s most serious problems is the Pacifi c Fleet’s decommissioned 
nuclear submarines. The USSR had some capacity to handle decommissioned submarines, 
which were removed from active service under the planned schedule. However, after the 
Soviet collapse, Russia inherited an excess of submarines, which the crisis-stricken national 
3   See, for example, The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, signed by President Dmitriy 
Medveded in May 2009: available at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html (in Russian, accessed 6 
August 2009).
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economy could not afford to maintain. Furthermore, international agreements obliged 
Russia to reduce its strategic nuclear forces, leading to a large-scale decommissioning of 
the Russian Navy’s submarines, including those based in the Far East.
According to offi cial Russian sources, the radio-ecological situation along the 
Pacifi c coast of Russia can be described as normal. Radioactive contamination of the 
environment, accumulated during the course of the lengthy nuclear operation of the 
Russian Pacifi c fl eet, has not spread beyond administrative borders of the Pacifi c Fleet 
units, except for the aforementioned Chazhma Bay accident. However, experts point out 
that the potential for an accident may be signifi cant because of the technological diffi culty 
of dismantling nuclear submarines (Press release 2002).
The problems of handling decommissioned submarines grew especially acute in 
the mid-1990s. By 1996, dismantlement work halted because of the lack of necessary 
technical equipment for submarine cutting and defueling. Previously used fl oating repair 
and maintenance facilities were dilapidated and no longer functioned, and Russia lacked 
adequate fi nancial resources to fund the dismantlement. International cooperation was the 
only way to solve these problems. Thanks to US aid given under the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction program, modernization of the existing Pacifi c Fleet submarine dismantlement 
infrastructure began. In 1999, Russia and the United States signed a contract that created 
an entirely new system for unloading spent nuclear fuel.
Japan also gave Russia a signifi cant amount of aid for safe submarine 
dismantlement. Whereas the United States was mostly concerned with the dismantlement 
of strategic nuclear submarines capable of carrying intercontinental ballistic missiles and 
posing potential military threat, Japan, because of its proximity to the Russian Pacifi c 
Fleet bases and nuclear facilities, was more anxious about environmental threats than 
strategic ones. For example, Japan allocated 36 million USD for the construction of a 
fl oating facility for liquid radioactive waste reprocessing. The Japanese were supportive 
of this facility because low-level liquid radioactive waste had been released into the Sea 
of Japan without any treatment before this facility came into operation.4
Over the past decade, most of the 75 decommissioned nuclear submarines in the 
Russian Far East have been dismantled. As of 2009, 10 submarines are left that await 
dismantlement. It is expected that the task will be completed by 2010. Although Russia 
itself has provided the bulk of the funding and could solve this problem on its own, budget 
constraints meant the process might be lengthy. International aid helped speed it up. The 
biggest donors have been Japan, the US and Canada, while Australia, New Zealand and 
the Republic of Korea made fi nancial contributions as well. The international funding 
goes to fi nancing the dismantlement activities as well as building infrastructure to treat 
and secure waste from the decommissioned and dismantled subs. 
Non-nuclear military-related environmental hazards
Numerous non-nuclear military facilities and installations scattered over the region 
also pose serious environmental threats. Submarine dismantlement, radioactive waste 
reprocessing, and other nuclear aspects of environmental security have received attention 
and funding from the Russian and foreign governments, but the environmental hazards 
emanating from more conventional arsenals in the Far East are viewed as somewhat 
less important. Although conventional weapons are not perceived as strategic threats in 
4   For more details, see: Chuen C and T. Troyakova. 2001. The Complex Politics of Foreign Assistance:Building 
the Landysh in the Russian Far East. The Nonproliferation Review 8, No. 2: 134–149.
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military and political terms, the environmental risks they generate may be even more 
menacing than their nuclear counterparts.
Risks from conventional sources have drastically increased since the early 
1990s, when the army and navy units in the Russian Far East began undergoing a 
considerable reduction. As part of this process, less and less money was allocated for the 
maintenance of military infrastructure, including arsenals containing numerous piles of 
weapons accumulated during Soviet times. This, along with a lack of central control and 
management, and a reduction in the numbers of the Russian armed forces, has contributed 
to the deterioration of morale and discipline among servicemen. As a result, there has been a 
considerable rise in military-related accidents, dangerously affecting the security of people 
and the environment. For example, in 1992 a confl agration broke out on the grounds of 
the Pacifi c Fleet’s ordnance arsenal in Vladivostok. The equivalent of 1,300 railway cars 
of artillery shells exploded. Shell splinters struck nearby apartment buildings, breaking 
windows and slicing through people’s homes. One person was killed and six people were 
wounded. Unexploded shells were scattered all over the neighborhood. In 1994, a Pacifi c 
Fleet air force arsenal exploded at Novonezhino village, not far from Vladivostok. The 
Pacifi c Fleet commander was sacked in the wake of the accident. However, the situation 
did not improve and the accidental explosion of military arsenals continued. In July 2003, 
another of the Pacifi c Fleet’s arsenal exploded in a rural suburb of Vladivostok, injuring 
twenty-seven people. In October 2005, a Pacifi c Fleet arsenal that stored decommissioned 
munitions near the city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky in Kamchatka exploded. More than 
seven thousand local residents were evacuated (Rian Online 2005). When such accidents 
are investigated, the military usually claim that an acute lack of funding makes it diffi cult 
to properly maintain arsenals and dispose of old weapons and chemicals. 
Grave environmental threats also emanate from military stocks of various 
chemicals. For instance, as the local press reported in 2000, a Pacifi c Fleet storage 
facility in Vladivostok contained 280 tons of highly toxic missile fuel. The old tanks were 
corroding and the missile fuel was gradually evaporating. According to experts, if there 
had been a major leak from the storage facility, more than one million Primorsky Krai 
residents could have died (Sablin 2000: 5). In October 2003, another shocking accident 
was reported at the Barsovy wildlife reservation south of Vladivostok. This unique 
reservation is a habitat for the last thirty Far Eastern leopards on earth and a number of 
other rare animals. It was also home to an army storage facility containing napalm and 
other toxic chemicals. The military abandoned the facility and it was left unguarded. A 
group of local residents who made their living gathering scrap metal for trade entered 
the storage ground and emptied approximately 800 metal drums of chemicals onto the 
ground. These chemicals ignited, which badly damaged 385,000 square meters of the 
reservation’s territory (Eho-DV 2003).
Fuel contamination accidents from the navy and army units also occur, including 
major ones. In September 2005, forty-three tons of fuel oil from the Pacifi c Fleet’s tanks 
in Vladivostok was offi cially reported to have leaked into the sea, contaminating the city’s 
beaches and coastal waters.5 Minor leaks are reported almost every year in Vladivostok 
and other Pacifi c Fleet bases. In July 2009, an oil slick emerged in one of the city’s bays 
where the warships were conducting exercises in preparation for the naval parade. 
5  According to some unoffi cial estimates, as much as 300 tons of oil leaked into the sea.
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Environmental Problems of Marine Biological Resources and Forest Exploitation
Exploitation of the sea and forest’s biological resources is one of the mainstays of the 
Russian Far East’s economy. However, overexploitation of these resources leads to 
depletion, reduction of biological diversity, and the total extinction of a number of unique 
species. Many of the problems connected with fi shing grew especially acute after the 
Soviet Union collapsed and effective government control over the fi shing industry ended. 
It became very hard to verify Russian and foreign fi shing companies’ compliance with 
environmentally justifi ed quotas, especially as fi shery supervisory authorities were (and 
remain) notorious for rampant corruption. Fishing enterprises in the Russian Far East 
were quickly privatized in the 1990s, often with gross violations of the law. The structural 
composition of the fi shery catch also changed. Priority shifted to the exploitation of 
species such as sea urchins, crabs, and other sea animals that could be sold at high prices 
in foreign markets, producing huge profi ts. Excessive fi shing beyond legal quotas and 
illegal sales of the catches at sea and at foreign ports became common. As many formerly 
state-run fi shing enterprises closed down, largely because of mismanagement and lack 
of investment, rising unemployment and deteriorating economic conditions resulted in 
widespread offshore poaching among local populations. 
High demand for sea urchins, Kamchatka crabs, shellfi sh, jellyfi sh, clam and, 
particularly, trepang in East Asian countries caused large-scale poaching by both coastal 
populations and fi shing fi rms. Exhaustion has been happening so quickly that these 
formerly prevalent Far Eastern species are becoming rare. Primorskiy Krai’s waters (in the 
south of the Russian Far East) suffer the most from poaching of invertebrate sea animals, 
followed by the waters surrounding the South Kuril Islands and Sakhalin. Illicit fi shing 
and poaching activities are common, even in state-guarded reservations. The amount of 
illegally procured salmon caviar has also drastically increased.
The population of the Kamchatka crab has been hit particularly hard. Further 
exploitation threatens its very existence. Illegal exploitation of the trepang reduced its 
population in the Russian Far East to critical levels. The gray sea urchin is also endangered. 
The numbers of nerka (sockeye salmon) off eastern Kamchatka are declining and have 
already reached dangerously low levels. The Kamchatka populations of other salmon-like 
species, such as kizhuch and chavycha have also declined.6 Illegal catches in the Russian 
Far East are far bigger than the offi cially and environmentally approved quotas. In 2007, 
for instance, according to the Federal Fishing Agency, 500,000 tons of salmon species 
were actually caught in Russia’s Pacifi c waters, whereas the quota was just 360,000 
tons. The amount of sea urchin catch exceeded the environmental quota by six times 
(Yarmoshevich 2008). 
The main destinations for illegal fi sh exports are Japan, China and South Korea. 
Russian offi cials complain that the governments of these countries are reluctant to 
effectively cooperate with Russia on combating the illegal fi sh trade, even though they are 
aware that much of the fi sh and seafood their companies are buying is caught in Russian 
waters illegally. For example, even though crab fi shing was offi cially banned in Russia, 
Japanese traders in Hokkaido continued to purchase the crab originating from Russian 
waters.7 Japan, Korea and China do not apparently want to damage their industries, which 
greatly depend on Russia’s marine resources. 
6  Personal interviews with environmental and law enforcement analysts, October 2005: Vladivostok.
7  Interview with a Vladivostok-based fi shing company manager. Vladivostok, July 2009.
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The degradation of the Far Eastern forests also causes severe environmental 
problems. The state authorities are unable to exercise effective control over the timber 
business, which is characterized by major violations of environmental and fi scal 
regulations. Illegal timber felling and the cutting of tree species that are protected by law 
are common. The volume of timber cut far exceeds offi cially authorized limits. Large 
amounts of timber are felled without offi cial permission or licenses. According to WWF 
estimates, illicit logging constitutes approximately 40 percent of the total volume of timber 
cut in the Russian Far East. According to the Federal Forestry Authority, 2,500 violations 
of environmental regulations, mainly illicit felling, were reported in the Russian Far East 
in 2008 (Wood Online 2008). 
Seeking higher profi ts, timber businesses often cut the most valuable tree species, 
leaving behind less valuable fallen timber. According to some estimates, from 25 percent 
to 50 percent of cut timber is left rotting. Environmental and safety violations often lead 
to fi res ravaging vast tracts of woodland. In some cases, forests are set on fi re intentionally 
to conceal illicit logging.8 Illegal and environmentally harmful timber cutting activities 
are mainly driven by high demand from foreign markets, above all China. The illegal 
timber business generates huge profi ts, which are then shared with corrupt offi cials. 
Environmental Security and Energy Projects in the Russian Far East
Energy projects related to oil and gas extraction and transportation have also become 
major factors impacting the ecology of the Russian Far East. The most important of these 
are the development of the Sakhalin Shelf’s oil and gas resources and the construction of 
an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, international 
oil companies were allowed to exploit offshore oil deposits in the Russian Far East, 
particularly off eastern Sakhalin in the Sea of Okhotsk.
In 1999, under the Sakhalin-2 offshore oil project operated by Sakhalin Energy 
consortium, the industrial extraction of oil started. The Molikpak platform, after being 
used in the Canadian Arctic waters, was installed in Piltun Bay. Thus far, there have been 
no major accidents or disasters associated with Sakhalin oil and gas projects. Yet some 
conservationists, along with indigenous peoples’ organizations and local communities’ 
municipal governments, continue to insist that the environmental risks are extremely 
high. The Sea of Okhotsk is one of the world’s most biologically productive seas. The 
waters near northeastern Sakhalin provide a habitat for the endangered western gray 
whale. Given the diffi cult weather conditions in the Sea of Okhotsk, there is the potential 
for a large oil spill, which can be caused by damaged or overturned tankers or disruptions 
in oil-pumping equipment. The damage to fi sheries, marine mammals, and seabirds is 
potentially enormous. Environmental activists and the Sakhalin indigenous peoples 
staged several actions of protest, including blockading oil and gas infrastructure facilities 
on northern Sakhalin. 
In 2006, the Russian government charged Sakhalin Energy with gross violations of 
environmental laws. The authorities in Moscow even went so far as to threaten Sakhalin 
Energy with criminal prosecution and annulling its operation license. In the wake of these 
much publicized accusations, in December 2006, the Sakhalin Energy shareholders, 
Royal Dutch Shell, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, agreed to sell a majority stake to Russia’s 
8  Interview with an environmental protection offi cer, September 2006: Vladivostok.
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government-owned Gazprom. This led some analysts to the conclusion that environment-
related charges were just a trick to wrest control of a lucrative business from the foreign 
companies. One may see this case as an illustration of a highly selective enforcement of 
environmental rules in Russia. 
Environmentalists are also alarmed by the project of a grand pipeline from eastern 
Siberia to the Russian Pacifi c coast, which is now being implemented by the company 
Transneft.9 They believe the Eastern Siberia–Pacifi c Ocean (Eastern pipeline) project, 
which is to pipe 80 million tons of oil to Asia Pacifi c markets annually, does not take into 
account all ecological hazards. Environmental experts point out that the territories that the 
4770 km long pipeline would cross have a complicated geological structure and rugged 
terrain, including permafrost and highly seismic areas. There are numerous mountain 
ridges, rivers, and lakes on the pipeline route. In this respect, the engineering diffi culties 
of the construction are similar to those of the Trans-Alaska pipeline. Environmentalists 
were especially alarmed that the Eastern pipeline would run in immediate proximity to 
Lake Baikal, the world’s largest freshwater reservoir and a unique natural treasure.
There was also a controversy over the terminal point of the pipeline. Transneft 
insisted that Perevoznaya Bay, not far from Vladivostok and just near the Russian-Korean 
border, is the best place for the terminal site. However, many environmental groups and 
experts argued that this option involved high ecological risks. Environmentalists were 
especially worried that the terminal construction and operation would inevitably damage 
unique Perevoznaya Bay’s marine and littoral ecosystems and the larger Bay of Peter the 
Great, where Russia’s only preserved marine habitat is situated. It could also endanger the 
habitat of the rare Far Eastern leopards. Environmentalists claimed that they did not reject 
the pipeline, but wanted its planners to be more responsive to ecological concerns.
Vigorous campaigning by environmental groups appears to have made some impact 
on the pipeline planners, who introduced corrections to the initial project. In particular, 
the pipeline route was moved north, further from the Lake Baikal, thus reducing dangers 
for its unique ecosystem.10 In addition the fi nal point of the pipeline, which included an 
oil terminal, was transferred from Perevoznaya Bay to the less vulnerable Koz’mino Bay, 
near the city of Nakhodka. 
Environmental Issues in Urban Areas of the Russian Far East
Approximately three-fourths of the Russian Far East’s population lives in cities. 
Vladivostok, the largest city of the Russian Far East with a population of around 700,000, 
exemplifi es the environmental problems confronting the urban areas of the region. One 
of the most important environmental concerns in Vladivostok is the absence of sewage 
treatment facilities. More than 90 percent of sewage goes into the sea without treatment, 
polluting the coastal waters. Moreover, waste from ships and port facilities is often dumped 
straight into the sea. According to environmental offi cials, 85 percent of the water area of 
the Golden Horn Bay, the main Vladivostok harbor, is biologically dead (Konnov 2003: 
3). Only two beaches in Vladivostok are offi cially approved by sanitary authorities for 
9   Transneft is a state-owned monopoly operating all long-distance pipelines in Russia via which oil is ex-
ported to other countries.
10   The decision was fi nally made after President Vladimir Putin personally intervened and ordered to shift 
the pipeline away from Baikal. See, for example, Krashakov Alexei and Sergey Kez. 2006. “Ekologi 
dobilis’ svoyego,” Nezavisimaya gazeta. 4 April.
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bathing. They warn that swimming at other city beaches may be harmful to health because 
of excessive water contamination. The construction of the sewage treatment installations 
in Vladivostok only started in 2009. However, this welcome move was motivated by the 
political necessity to improve the city’s image ahead of the APEC summit, which is to 
take place in Vladivostok in 2012, rather than by environmental considerations per se. 
The Russian Far East also faces a problem with urban solid waste disposal. The 
garbage reprocessing plant in Vladivostok is capable of reprocessing only a fraction of 
the city’s rubbish. The rest is transported to the smoking dump site, which sits on the 
seashore in proximity to the city. Just as with the sewage treatment case, the Russian 
government earmarked the money to relocate the landfi ll and build modern recycling 
installations in Vladivostok. Many other Far Eastern cities, which are not so lucky to host 
a major international event, will continue to dispose of their waste by just dumping it in 
the suburban areas. 
Transnational Threats to Environmental Security
As a border region, the Russian Far East experiences signifi cant pressure from transnational 
environmental factors. The most serious external threat to the ecology of the Far East is 
posed by China’s explosive economic growth and overpopulation. While China itself has 
been seriously suffering from increasing economic activity, it has also infl icted signifi cant 
environmental damage on the adjacent territories of Russia, as well as other Northeast 
Asian countries.
One of the most urgent problems is the pollution of trans-border rivers and lakes 
with industrial and communal waste generated in China, where waste treatment systems 
are virtually nonexistent. For example, in the Amur and Ussury river basins in Northeast 
China, there are scores of oil refi neries, chemical and pulp factories, including Asia’s 
biggest pulp and paper mill. None of them have proper waste reprocessing facilities 
(Ishaev 2006). This makes Russian border territories exposed to environmental accidents 
in China. The biggest one so far happened in November 2005, when over 100 tons of 
highly toxic benzole leaked from a chemical plant in the Chinese city of Tzilin into the 
Songhua River, which is the largest tributary of Amur, the great river shared by Russia 
and China. The toxic chemicals reached Russian towns and cities downstream threatening 
their water supplies.
Largely due to industrial and sewage pollution from the Chinese side, the 
environmental condition of Amur, as well as other trans-border rivers and lakes, is 
alarming. In the wake of the benzole accident in 2005, China has taken a number of steps 
to tackle the problem. In particular, Beijing allocated nearly USD$2 billion to deal with the 
pollution of the Songhua River.11 Moreover, China agreed to set up a joint governmental 
commission with Russia to monitor the environmental condition of trans-border rivers 
and lakes and their basins. Hopefully, it will help remedy the situation, although so far 
there has been no visible improvement. 
The China factor also contributes to the ongoing deforestation of the Far Eastern 
territories. China’s Heilongjiang Province, which borders Primorsky Krai, saw a fi ve-
fold reduction of forest area over the past century (Valaam 2002). A similar process is 
currently taking place in Primorskiy Krai and other Far Eastern territories. The ban on 
11  See http://eco.rian.ru/nature/20081015/153195654.html (15 October 2008).
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timber cutting in China has resulted in the transfer of Chinese timber business activities 
to the Russian Far East. Chinese dealers are willing to buy large amounts of timber from 
across the border and pay in cash. Depredation of forest resources is especially rampant in 
those rural Far Eastern areas, which are struggling with economic depression. For many 
local residents, illegal timber cutting has become the easiest way to earn a living. 
Demand from voracious Chinese markets also threatens endangered wildlife 
species. The lion’s share of the poachers’ prey from the Russian Far East is smuggled to 
China.12 These illegal wildlife exports include species like tigers, leopards, bears, deer, 
fur animals, pheasants, turtles, frogs, and their parts and derivatives. Marine and river 
species also fall prey to transnational poachers. Chinese fi shermen use environmentally 
dangerous methods like chemicals, explosions, and electric shock, which do irreparable 
harm to biological resources. 
Another cause for concern is the agricultural activities of Chinese farmers who 
lease land in the Russian Far East for growing rice and other crops. Russian rural residents 
are often reluctant to toil on their land, seeking higher pay and more profi table business, 
while Chinese laborers are willing to work even in harsh conditions and for modest 
money. That comes with a cost, however, as the Chinese agricultural fi rms are seeking to 
maximize their returns, often using excessive amounts of fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides 
and other chemicals. Such practices harm the soil and contaminate the ecosystems of 
rivers and lakes (Brazhina 2009). 
Conclusion
Despite a broad range of worrisome problems, it would be something of a misnomer 
to characterize the state of the environment in the Russian Far East as utterly dire or 
disastrous. Most areas of Pacifi c Russia can boast relatively unaffected or even pristine 
ecosystems.13 However, this is mainly due to their sparse population and low levels of 
economic activity, rather than effective conservation policies. Neglect of environmental 
protection is characteristic of central authorities in Moscow as well as regional and local 
governments and businesses. Awareness of environmental issues among the majority of the 
population is also quite low. The words like “green economy”, “sustainable development” 
or “carbon footprint” seem to most Russians just another Western fad, having little to do 
with their real life concerns. This is not surprising. Many of Russia’s regions and local 
communities are mostly preoccupied with survival and economic development. When 
one does not have decent housing, health care or job opportunities, one naturally tends to 
view environmental issues as of secondary importance at best. 
Large-scale activities to protect the environment require signifi cant fi nancial 
resources which, it could be argued, could be channeled elsewhere. The fi ndings of a 
public opinion survey are indicative of this attitude. Russians were asked how they would 
spend the money from the country’s sovereign wealth fund. Most respondents suggested 
that the money should be used to raise senior citizens’ pensions and increase the salaries 
of people working in education, health care, and other public services. Environmental 
concerns were at the bottom of the list. Only 4 percent of those polled supported fi nancing 
12  Interview with an environmental protection offi cer. Vladivostok, September, 2006.
13   It is noteworthy that Japanese fi sh traders in Hokkaido prefer Russia’s fi sh and seafood to those coming 
from Chinese and Korean waters, because they believe Russian fi sh is of higher environmental quality 
(interview with a Vladivostok-based fi shing company manager. Vladivostok, July 2009).
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environmental programs (Dengi Info Online 2007). According to another poll, conducted 
among residents of Vladivostok, just 7 per cent ranked environment as the most pressing 
issue.14 
In a formal sense, Russia has a legal and administrative infrastructure for 
environmental protection. However, federal and local environmental agencies are not 
independent and exercise only limited infl uence. This situation is exacerbated by corruption. 
Environmental legislation is often enforced selectively and arbitrarily. Assessments of 
environmental consequences of projects made by government agencies are commonly 
based on considerations of political and economic expediency. Sometimes environmental 
safety standards are “forgotten”, while in other cases environmental legislation is invoked 
to block the implementation of certain projects, or to blackmail certain companies. 
Another problem is that many environmental organizations and groups active in 
Russia are funded by the West, so that they are often suspected of promoting foreign 
countries’ political and economic goals to the detriment of Russian national interests. 
Such concerns are voiced even at the highest political levels. For instance, in July 2005 
President Vladimir Putin, commenting on the issue of the Eastern pipeline construction, 
remarked: “Environmental assessments must not hamper the development of the country 
and national economy. Once we start doing something, they are always using environmental 
charges as one of the ways to block our efforts” (Kishkovskym 2005). 
At this point, it would be naive to expect Russia and its Far Eastern territories to 
strictly comply with high environmental standards. Progress in environmental protection 
will primarily depend on Russia’s achievements in economic and social development, as 
well as the formation of strong civil society institutions, especially those promoting green 
politics. 
The environmental issues of the Russian Far East should also be seen in the 
broader regional context of Northeast Asia. Some of the problems can be effectively dealt 
with only at the regional level through collective action. For instance, combating marine 
poaching by the Russian authorities alone makes little sense as long as Japan, Korea and 
China continue to purchase the Kamchatka crab and other endangered species, fi shing 
for which is banned in Russia. Unfortunately, Northeast Asia still lacks meaningful 
multilateral cooperation on environmental protection. This stands in some contrast 
to political cooperation on Northeast Asia’s strategic issues, where the six-party talks 
mechanism has been established. 
That said, there have recently been some positive developments in environmental 
collaboration in the region. In December 2008, during their trilateral summit in Fukuoka, 
the leaders of China, Japan and South Korea signed the Action Plan for Promoting 
Trilateral Cooperation (2008), which also includes a special section on environmental 
protection. However, the fl edgling environmental partnership in a multilateral mode is 
still essentially limited to only three Northeast Asian countries, with Russia remaining 
outside. Engaging Russia would contribute to a more effective and robust environmental 
regime in Northeast Asia.
14  Far Eastern Consulting Center. Vladivostok, June 2007.
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